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Abstract
This is a review article that analyze previous research results and contrasts them with the firm theory 
in order to propose an economic organization structure for Boyacá’s mining sector. Results indicate 
that the present scheme of contracts between producers and intermediaries is inefficient and pro-
motes inequality. The highest benefits proportion is in the intermediation side, despite the risk and 
effort falls mainly on the producer. Three different forms of sector’s organization are presented, as 
well as pros and cons aspects from each side are analyzed, in the light of the theoretical framework 
proposed. Most region farmers are smallholders and they are characterized by a high heterogeneity, 
it is conclude that alliance scheme is more economic and socially efficient in the relationship between 
producer and market.
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ESTRUCTURA ORGANIZACIONAL PARA  
UNA MINA DE CARBÓN EN BOYACÁ
Resumen
Este es un artículo de revisión que analiza los resultados de investigaciones previas y los contrasta 
con la teoría de la firma con el propósito de proponer una forma de organización económica para 
el sector minero de Boyacá. Los resultados señalan que el esquema actual de contratos entre pro-
ductores e intermediarios es ineficiente y promueve la desigualdad. La mayor proporción de los 
beneficios queda en manos de los intermediarios, a pesar de que el riesgo y el esfuerzo recaen sobre 
el productor, principalmente. Se presentan tres diferentes formas de organización para el sector y se 
analizan los aspectos positivos y negativos de cada una de ellas a la luz del marco teórico propuesto. 
Como en su mayoría los productores de la región son pequeños y se caracterizan por una alta he-
terogeneidad, se concluye que el esquema de alianzas es más eficiente económica y socialmente en 
la relación entre productor y mercado. 
Palabras clave: Producción de carbón, Diseño organizacional, Contratos, Alianzas.
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ESTRUTURA ORGANIZACIONAL PARA  
UMA MINA DE CARVÃO EM BOYACÁ
Resumo
Este é um artigo de revisão que analisa os resultados de pesquisas prévias e os contrasta com a 
teoria da empresa com o propósito de propor uma forma de organização econômica para o setor 
mineiro de Boyacá. Os resultados assinalam que o esquema atual de contratos entre produtores e 
intermediários é ineficiente e promove a desigualdade. A maior proporção dos benefícios fica nas 
mãos dos intermediários, apesar de que o risco e o esforço recaem sobre o produtor, principalmente. 
Apresentam-se três diferentes formas de organização para o setor e se analisam os aspectos positivos 
e negativos de cada uma delas à luz do marco teórico proposto. Como em sua maioria os produtores 
da região são pequenos e se caracterizam por uma alta heterogeneidade, conclui-se que o esquema 
de alianças é mais eficiente econômica e socialmente na relação entre produtor e mercado.
Palavras chave: Produção de carvão, Desenho organizacional, Contratos, Alianças.
Rosso, J. (2014) Organizational Structure for Coal Mining in Boyacá. En: Revista de la Facultad de 
Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad Militar Nueva Granada. rev.fac.cienc.econ, XXII (1).
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1. Introduction
According to Warner & Sullivan (2004), extractive 
industries have raised importance in the worldwide 
economy, and especially, in developing and emer-
ging economies, when measured by the flow of fore-
ign direct investment (FDI). Due to the rapid growth 
of the industry, there are many challenges in mana-
ging, environmental, and particularly, in social issues 
to be faced by institutions in these countries. This 
article reflects on an economic and social problem of 
one of the coal producing regions in Colombia, as is 
Boyaca. The main objective is to analyze the secon-
dary data from field-based research that were collec-
ted in year 2011 by Benavides et al. (2011), and to 
propose an efficient form of organization for the coal 
mining sector in this region. First, I propose three di-
fferent alternatives of organization; second, I analyze 
the pros and cons of each organizational form; and 
third, I present the best organizational alternative un-
der the paradigm of the theory of the firm.
Empirical evidence shows that the average producer 
in the region is small, lacks of technological develo-
pment and her financial capacity is minimum. These 
features make the producer subject of high infor-
mation asymmetry when engaged in an agreement 
(mostly informal) with the commercial intermediary. 
In this way, the current scheme of contracts between 
producers and commercial intermediaries is ineffi-
cient and promotes inequity. These results are in line 
with the findings of Krug & Mehta (2001), whose sta-
tement claims that “high transaction costs associated 
with uncertainty, together with resource constraints, 
are responsible for pushing entrepreneurs into these 
agreements” (Krug & Mehta, 2001, 3). In addition, 
cultural features of local producers like individualism, 
has made to fall the negotiation capacity of the pro-
ducers, since they manage the intermediary in diffe-
rent ways, and this isolation is economically ineffec-
tive (Franks, Brereton, & Moran, 2010).
There is no doubt that as in the rest of developing 
economies and emerging markets, the extractive in-
dustry has became economically important, in Co-
lombia it also has been as well. In Colombia, mining 
has increasing its total production during last 20 
years (Figure 1). Total production, without emeralds, 
has become almost threefold; it was 31.750 K-ton in 
early 90’s and has increased up to 86.750 K-ton in 
2010. From such production, coal represented near 
67% at the beginning of this period, and has reached 
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1 Source: Own elaboration. Data: INGEOMINAS.
2 Further information and detailed statistical information at www.dane.gov.co
3 Own calculation based on the information reported by UPME (2011) and Gobernación de Boyacá: http://www.boyaca.gov.co/gober-
nacion/presupuesto/25-gobernacion/presupuesto/265-presupuestos-2006-2007-2008-y-2010
Figure 1. Colombia’s total mineral production1
85% nowadays, approximately. Other minerals like 
Cooper or precious metals like Silver or Gold, have 
not significant weight over the total production.
Since coal mining has reached an important role in 
the economy, it is important to see where the coal 
resources and the production are. In Colombia, La 
Guajira and Cesar departments have the biggest pro-
portion (84%) of coal reserves (Figure 2).
Boyaca is considered one of the regions with smaller 
coal deposits (Jähnig, 2007). As it is observed, Boya-
ca just have 2% of total coal reserves. However, as sta-
ted before, in the region this activity has a remarkable 
importance in the economy. Mining generates from 
4.000 to 8.000 jobs (Benavides et al., 2011). 
The role of the mining in the regional economy is 
important because in spite of representing just 2% 
of the regional GDP, its growth has rounded 20% in 
the last years2 (DANE, 2011). Production does not 
have grown as in the Caribbean region (See Figure 
3), but its importance is due to the characteristics of 
regional economy. Moreover, the transferences from 
National Government corresponding to royalties for 
coal extraction were equivalent to the 0,82% of the 
total regional income budget in 20103. Therefore, it 
is necessary to have an optimal organizational struc-
ture to get better economically and socially efficient 
results.
Boyaca is considered one of the regions with sma-
ller coal deposits (Jähnig, 2007). As it is observed, 
Boyaca just have 2% of total coal reserves. Howe-
ver, as stated before, in the region this activity has a 
remarkable importance in the economy. Mining ge-
nerates from 4.000 to 8.000 jobs (Benavides et al., 
2011). 
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The role of the mining in the regional economy is 
important because in spite of representing just 2% 
of the regional GDP, its growth has rounded 20% in 
the last years6 (DANE, 2011). Production does not 
have grown as in the Caribbean region (Figure 3), 
but its importance is due to the characteristics of re-
gional economy. Moreover, the transferences from 
National Government corresponding to royalties for 
coal extraction were equivalent to the 0,82% of the 
total regional income budget in 20107. Therefore, it 
is necessary to have an optimal organizational struc-
ture to get better economically and socially efficient 
results.
In Colombia, coal mining has not been planning as 
an institutional policy. Great deals of coal resources 
are mined in illegal way (it is known as ‘fact mining’). 
The Government has promoted some laws (Law 
141/1994, Law 685/2001 and Law 1382/2010), but 
they have not rendered the expected results mining 
coal (Güiza, 2010, 83).
Figure 2. Colombia’s total coal reserves4
4 Source: Own elaboration. Data: INGEOMINAS.
5 Further information and detailed statistical information at www.dane.gov.co
6 Own calculation based on the information reported by UPME (2011) and Gobernación de Boyacá: http://www.boyaca.gov.co/gober-
nacion/presupuesto/25-gobernacion/presupuesto/265-presupuestos-2006-2007-2008-y-2010
7 Centro de Investigación Económica y Social –FEDESARROLLO: http://www.fedesarrollo.org.co/
1.1 Method
Data collection procedures: This study used secon-
dary data from field-based research that were collec-
ted in year 2011 by Benavides et al. (2011). They 
were presented to the sponsor institution8 in 2011 to 
study the current characterization of the small-scale 
coal mining in the central region of Colombia. The 
list of sources includes 11 meetings between small-
scale producers, 2 with regional associations and 
established firms, and 16 detailed interviews in 4 
departments.
Authors apply a cluster analysis to classify the pro-
ducers. All the clusters are characterized by using di-
fferent variables. I review this information and define 
three different forms of organization. I compare each 
alternative under the theory of the firm (Spulber, 
2009) paradigm. Then, analyze the pros and cons 
and recommend the best form of organization for 
coal mining sector in Boyaca. 
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8 Source: Own elaboration. Data: INGEOMINAS.
9 This is a kind of administrative entity defined on a specific territory by the National Government (Mining Ministry), in association 
with the local Government. Its main characteristic is that the principal economic activity is mining. It is created with the purpose is to 
develop policies towards management and economic efficiency of mining activity (Fundacion para el Desarrollo del Quindío, 2008).
10 Boyaca has a sub-regional division called ‘Provincias’ (in English: provinces). This kind of territory is bigger than a municipality but 
smaller than a department. Each province has a number of municipalities and one recognized province’s capital. There are 15 sub-
regional divisions in total.
11 The report “Mineria de hecho en Colombia” (Fact mining in Colombia), by Güiza (2010) is part of a series of reports presented by the 
Defensor del Pueblo, in the developing of his functions in citizen rights defense.
Figure 3. Colombia’s coal production8
2. Characterization of the mining sector 
in Colombia and Boyaca
The coal reserve areas of Boyacá go from the muni-
cipality of Jericó, in the north, to the border with the 
department of Cundinamarca; the main mining area 
is located between the municipalities of Sogamoso 
and Jericó, which has bituminous type coals (Mejía, 
2005, 29).
Boyaca has established mining districts9 to improve 
the conditions of the miners and to control this ac-
tivity. One of the most important of them, for coal 
mining, is the North Boyaca District, which includes 
23 municipalities from 3 provinces10. There are 210 
mining titles operating (Güiza, 2010, 176). By the 
Act 354/2009 from Ministerio de Minas y Energia 
(Energy and Mining Ministry), it was declared a spe-
cial reserve of coal in Jerico municipality, given the 
poor conditions of the exploitation in that zone.
In Boyaca metallurgic coal is around 58% of the total 
coal production, while thermal coal is the comple-
mentary 42% over the total. The extraction of this 
mineral is characterized for being, between 70% or 
80%, an illegal activity. In general, illegal mining is 
present in the 44% of the total municipalities in the 
country and it represents near 30% of the total mi-
ning exports (Güiza, 2010).
For example, in the mining district of North Boyaca, 
there are identified 55 units of illegal mining (Table 
1), according with the Güiza (2010, 13) report11. 
This is in line with the findings of Lahiri-Dutt (2007) 
who points out that illegal mining prevails in the de-
veloping world. According to the author, immediate 
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consequences of this kind of activity are greater in-
equality and poverty, and environmental problems. 
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that, in gene-
ral, producers interviewed recognize the importance 
of being right with the authorities.
According to Benavides et al. (2011), mining activity 
is replacing the primary activities of the region: agri-
culture and livestock. However, it is estimated that 
48% of the mining is artisanal, 38% small scale mi-
ning, and just 14% is medium or great scale mining. 
It implies a poor development of technology and a 
high dependence on human labor. Some charac-
teristics of this type of mining are described as fo-
llowing (Table 1).
The information collected directly from Tasco mu-
nicipality, indicates that there are 32 illegal mining 
units in that zone. The consequences of the illegality 
are deeply considered in section three of this paper.
As observed in Benavides et al. (2011), other cul-
tural and personal characteristics of the miners in 
this region involve that miner is strong and resilient, 
and dedicated to her work, but in most cases they 
represent the first generation of miners with little ex-
perience compared with miners from other regions. 
Because the proportion of small scale and artisanal 
mining, their start in the business is very rudimentary; 
the level of professionalism is very low, and most of 
them do not perceive growing as needed since they 
assume mining just as a livelihood not as a business. 
It is a region that prefers to work with miners from 
the region, living in their homes near the mine; only 
20% to 30% come from other regions of the country 
(Benavides et al., 2011).
Related to the personality, they are people difficult to 
organize. The miners do not like to commit a sche-
dule work; they just work according to the individual 
capacity. Additionally, they use to spent part of their 
money on consumption of liquor (mainly beer). The-
se people are with little loyalty to the employer, move 
12 Ardila (2010, 176). ND means Not Available.
13 Note for correction: When author of this table refers to Jericó, it is a municipality in Boyacá with the same name of another munici-
pality in Antioquia, where environmental Authority is Corpoantioquia. However, concerning to Jericó (Boyacá) the environmental 
Authority is Corpoboyacá.
Table 1. Fact mining units in North Boyacá District of Mi-
ning12,13
Municipio Autoridad Ambiental No. de UEM de hecho
Jericó Corantioquia 0
Betéitiva Corpoboyacá* ND*
Boavita Corpoboyacá ND
Chiscas Corpoboyacá 2
Chita Corpoboyacá ND
Covarachía Corpoboyacá 0
El Cocuy Corpoboyacá ND
El Espino Corpoboyacá 2*
Güicán Corpoboyacá ND
La Uvita Corpoboyacá 36*
Panqueba Corpoboyacá ND
Paya Corporinoquia 0 según Corporinoquia
Paz del Río* Corpoboyacá 0
Pisba Corporinoquia 0 según Corporinoquia
San Mateo Corpoboyacá ND
Sativanorte Corpoboyacá 2*
Sativasur Corpoboyacá ND
Soatá Corpoboyacá ND
Socotá Corpoboyacá 10
Socha Corpoboyacá 2
Susacón Corpoboyacá 1*
Tasco Corpoboyacá ND
Tipacoque Corpoboyacá 0
from the mines in the region looking for the highest 
payment. The owner of the mine feels very frustrated 
by the lack of miner’s commitment (Table 2).
2.1 Production
In the region there are problems related to climate, 
since the winter affects the productivity of the mi-
nes for several months. Furthermore, after the rainy 
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season miners should carry out repairs which are 
costly. Additionally, environmental authority is not 
perceived as support but as prosecutor, so the miner 
perceives herself alone (Benavides et al., 2011).
Small-scale mining is generally characterized by pro-
duction units with a minimum degree of organiza-
tion, small-scale production and low level of tech-
nology. On the other hand the subsistence mining 
is comprised mostly of independent workers who 
combine this activity with other productive activities, 
especially agricultural, reason why mining becomes 
cyclical (Mesa Sectorial de Minería, 2003; UPME, 
2004).
In her study, Betancurt (2002) found that the techno-
logy used for extraction of the mineral, at the small 
mining, is mainly underground of cavern. There are 
used two methods: extraction by room and pillars 
and the method of long wall; being the former the 
most used in Colombia. In spite of its popularity, this 
method causes that the amount of coal extracted be 
relatively low.
Artisanal miners do not have any mechanization 
process. Small miners sometimes use compressed air 
for the perforation and coal starting operations. They 
have electrical power and it allows for ventilation un-
derground. Most of the mines have a low mechani-
zation and are based on an intensive manual labor; 
this has as a consequence a little cost of capital but 
a little amount of clean coal (Betancurt, 2002, 216).
Studies have demonstrated that mining sector in Bo-
yacá has a very low degree of R&D; it is possibly 
due to the poor education level of the miners (Bena-
vides et al., 2011; Betancurt, 2002; Mesa Sectorial 
de Minería, 2003). Artisanal miner is an individual 
who only reaches a primary level of education. Still, 
Benavides et al. (2011) found that the bigger is the 
size of the activity, the greater is the level of educa-
tion of the miners (or their staff, when apply).
2.2 Market and commercialization
Regarding the marketing activities, Boyacá has a 
high level of organizational complexity (Benavides et 
al., 2011). From the market perspective, the region is 
characterized by high industrial demand of coal, e.g. 
thermal industries, cement, paper and brick, the ne-
eds of power generation and exports of metallurgical 
coal. Additionally, this demand is highly stationary.
In another perspective are the distribution and 
marketing channels. According to Benavides et al. 
(2011) there is a high presence of arbitrageurs, which 
characterizes the market as one with multiple buyers 
and sellers, with a dominant position of the formers 
in price setting. The very small producers sell almost 
all their product to traders, excepting occasional sales 
to large consumers (due to some cases of very high 
quality). Small producers sell to medium and large 
regional customers (supply contracts) and some re-
tailers. On the other hand, the medium producers 
buy from other producers; they have storage facilities 
and add value classifying the product and preparing 
14 Source: translated from Benavides et al. (2011, 44).
Table 2. Characteristics of mining activity14
Artisanal 
Average production from 50 to 200tons/ month
Providesmaximum5 to 10 employees
Generally is not legal
Carry out a rudimentary extraction process(“pick and 
shovel”)
Small
A miner who has 1or3 mines, with a single production 
of near 500tons, for a total of 1000 to 1500tons approx.
Between10 and25 employees approx.(95% are blue co-
llar workers)
They are legal or are in the legalizing process
They have invested in infrastructure (has a compressor, 
electric winch, ventilation system, etc.)
Offers casino and camp for foreign miners
Medium
They produce between 3,000to 8,000 tons approx
Manage more than one mine, with an average of 25to 45 
employees per mine
They not consider highly technical, but important impro-
vements have been made: mechanization (tunnels with 
transportation system by rail or wood roads and locomo-
tive power, more than one compressor, ventilation sys-
tems, pneumatic hammers, lamps, etc.)
Offers casino and camp for foreign miners
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mixtures adapted to the characteristics of consumers 
with quality control. Their customers are usually lar-
ge consumers and sometimes they directly export.
In general, for the miners of the region, the sales 
abroad are of little interest given the characteristics of 
regional demand. For the small mining exports is too 
costly, because it requires a client, or customer pull, 
with a clear negotiation covenants. Additionally, it 
implies high requirements in terms of volume, trans-
portation costs, taxes, permits; and low flexibility in 
payment, as well as fluctuations in international pri-
ces (Benavides et al., 2011). Betancurt (2002, 212) 
considers that the reason why the Boyaca’s coal does 
not arrive at international markets is, mainly, due to 
the high transport costs from the center of the cou-
ntry to the coast, where ports are located. Actually, 
there is a road and rail infrastructure to supply the 
regional demand, only (Ponce, 2005).
3. Illegal mining consequences
There is evidence of the negative impact of illegal 
mining on the economic, social and environmental 
dimensions of any region (Aspinall, 2001; Dreschler, 
2001; Hilson, 2009; Kitula, 2006). According to Ba-
rry (1995, 1): “although it provides an important 
source of income, artisanal mining engenders a host 
of problems: environmental, health, and safety con-
cerns; labor and gender issues; and technical, finan-
cial, regulatory, and legal issues”. The fact that illegal 
mining in Boyaca rounded the 80% over the total, 
have negative impacts as well.
In the World Bank conference (Barry, 1995) pointed 
out that from the financial and technical perspecti-
ves, there are some serious problems in this kind of 
mining. Firstly, this miner does not have enough fi-
nancial resources to invest in technology (sometimes 
is not interested), and is not subject to any loan from 
the financial system. They have higher transaction 
cost related to de post exploitation activities (like pro-
duction gathering and commercialization).
Related to the commercialization, there are problems 
in the relationship of illegal miners with established 
mining enterprises or traders, because the illegal 
status of the formers. It is evident the existence of 
constrains in establishing legal contracts between the 
parts. Benavides et al. (2011) found that most of the 
contracts are not signed but there is a personal com-
promise (gentlemen’s agreement) between the parts. 
This imposes uncertainty over the long-term rela-
tionship and limits the investment decisions. This is 
in line with Das & Noushis’s contention related with 
the propensity to opportunistic behavior between the 
parties when the length of the relationship is percei-
ved just for a short-term (Das & Noushi, 2002).
That is the reason why small or artisanal miners have 
a real disadvantage in any contractual relationship, 
sometimes affecting their income and maintaining 
(or promoting) the illegal status quo. For Amaratun-
ga & Kumar (1994, 15), under such scheme, the be-
neficiaries are the traders, buying below market price 
to make quick profits.
According to Hansmann & Kraakman (2000, 808), 
there are two ways of coordinate the economic ac-
tivity of two parties: (i) by having direct contracts 
between each other, and (ii) Entering in a contract 
with a third party who coordinates the contractual 
relationship. In sum, an ex-ante mechanism for de-
terring opportunistic behavior is to write formal con-
tracts, and an ex-post mechanism is monitoring (Das 
& Noushi, 2002, 97).
3.1 Constrains to legalization process
In an environment where legalization implies a big 
effort, there are not incentives to legalization. As a 
matter fact, legalization process in Colombia implies a 
legal process15, plenty of prerequisites and activities by 
who is interested in established that a great number of 
illegal miners have not interest in legalization (Benavi-
des et al., 2011). Actually, most of them have decided 
to be illegal and assume the risk of their decision.
15 This site is an official web site for a legalization process of any exploitation contract with the State: http://www.gobiernoenlinea.gov.co/
web/guest/home/-/government-services/4367/maximized
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One of the biggest barriers related to this subject 
is the scanty capacity of small-scale miners to ac-
complish the technical and economical require-
ments imposed by laws, to operate a legal mine. 
Sometimes, this is due to the shortage of knowledge 
about these matters. On the other hand, the capa-
city of monitoring and control by government is not 
enough to cover all the illegal activities. In fact, one 
can find that public policy considers this level of 
control as good enough. The national Government 
judges that given the structure of the sector, whe-
re biggest enterprises own the 97% of the sector’s 
assets and they generates the 98% of the profits, 
it is not necessary to have any small size detailed 
analysis (Ruiz, 2007, 9).
This is a fact that has been found in different stu-
dies around the world. For example, Chakravorty 
(2001) showed a difficulty to gather information 
about this type of mining; Dreschler (2001) found 
that the sector is extremely mobile and flexible, mi-
ning activities can appear and disappear overnight, 
which makes it very difficult to control, even for lo-
cal authorities and NGOs working many years in 
the sector. In the case of sub Saharan Africa, for 
example, the approach taken to formalize and sup-
port this mining has resulted in the implementation 
of bureaucratic licensing schemes, and in the desig-
ning of ineffective and/or incompatible regulations 
(Hilson, 2009, 4).
Gathering producers would incentive the legaliza-
tion; the group shares the process, not only in expen-
ses, but also in the effort engaged. It should facilitate 
the relationship between authorities and miners for 
regulation and monitoring activities. On the other 
hand, the intervention of an intermediary could alle-
viate the costs of legalization by individuals. An inter-
mediary provides economies of scale and minimizes 
the informational costs (Gehrig, 1993).
Though, financial matters are other kind of cons-
trains because of the characteristics of the regional 
mining sector. Benavides et al. (2011) have found 
that traders are one of the most common financing 
resources. Traders have enough capital to provide 
the miner with cash flow resources in order to attend 
their daily operations. It could be considered a form 
of strategic loan, by means of which trader engage 
an underlying contract for buying coal. 
3.1.1 Market failure
It is worth to evaluate this type of activity and to con-
sider more detailed aspects, because it generates as-
ymmetries and delivers the bargaining power to the 
buyer. This aspect is treated on Spulber (1996a), by 
using a model of the market with endogenous price 
setting by intermediaries. The author found that de-
pending on the discount rate16, this could lead to an 
intermediary acting as a monopoly. Apreda (2001) 
considers the intermediary as a “broker of asymme-
tric information”.
It is assumed that the loan has no interest rate char-
ges; however, it is clear that the bargaining power 
of the lender allows her to set, in turn, the purcha-
se price once the coal has been extracted. Murry & 
Zhu (2008) mention that this bargain power creates 
asymmetries favoring intermediaries. This is termed 
in the literature of transaction costs as “lock-in situa-
tion”, which transform a bilateral exchange in to a 
command structure (Wathne & Heide, 2000).
On the other hand, since mining is a stationary and 
income variable activity, as was pointed out above, 
miner is not subject to credit for commercial banks. 
In fact, they do not have much interest in to access 
bank financing due to the existence of the alternative 
source from intermediaries.
It is clear that the common trader activity is an im-
perfect substitute for financial markets and leads to 
asymmetries between producers and consumers. 
In despite of being an apparent agreement without 
warranty, lender can take possession of the miner’s 
assets, but borrower does not perceive the situation 
due to a lack of an explicit interest rate. In this situa-
tion, besides, producer reaches a comfort zone that 
let her to get daily operating resources and inhibits 
improvements in technology, knowledge and legal 
practices.
16 In his model, Spulber consider the time as a transaction cost (Spulber, 1996a, 560)
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From these two conditions in the relationship bet-
ween producers and commercial traders, it is clear 
that there is a problem of control rights allocation. 
These control rights are defined as “the right from 
one party to affect the course of action of the busi-
ness in certain circumstances” (Tirole, 2010, 387). 
Since the intermediary have enough power on this 
relationship, the allocation of the control rights are 
not based on the willingness of the producer to trans-
fer them to the counterparty, but in the impossibility 
to exert them.
3.2 Illegality and property rights
As was described before, asymmetries between pro-
ducers and consumers make the parts to face pro-
blems regarding property rights. In spite of the miner 
being the owner of the resources, bargain structure 
imposes restrictions to her as a residual claimant. 
When buyers give financial resources to the pro-
ducers, or provide services as transport of the final 
product, they gain a power on the contractual rela-
tionship that poses her as residual claimant. It cau-
ses a fall in private benefits for the producer (Hart & 
Holmstrom, 2010, 3).
While it could be thought that one solution to this 
problem is to write complete contracts, it is not a 
final solution17, especially when writing complete 
contracts at no cost is impossible (Hart, 1988). On 
the other hand, most of the contracts between illegal 
miners and buyers are just gentlemen’s agreements. 
So, contracts enforcement is a constraint for symme-
tric relationships in this market because buyers face a 
moral hazard problem. Benavides et al. (2011) have 
identified that miners do not respect this kind of agre-
ements and, sometimes, decide to sell the product to 
any consumer that is paying the better price.
This kind of behavior is correlated as much with the 
size if the trader. Traders as intermediaries have been 
identified in the market, mainly being of three types 
(Benavides et al., 2011):
• Intermediary traders: they benefit from producer’s 
necessities of financing and other resources. Their 
payments are 30 to 90 days in average. As well, 
generate distortions on the market since they set 
the buying and selling price.
• Permanent traders: they pay in a short term, 8 
days in average. The prices are ruled by the size 
of the producer (first degree price discrimina-
tion). They have storage facilities and add value 
by classifying coal.
• Temporary traders: they appear sporadically 
paying higher prices than the market. They do 
not require specific quantity or quality. Usually 
rent a space, but are not established in the area. 
They use to pay cash.
In this perspective, illegality promotes unfair compe-
tition between legal producers and generates price 
wars, which leads to price volatility Due to this si-
tuation, producers needs to engage in vertical inte-
gration with the trading activity (Hart & Holmstrom, 
2010). As consequence medium scale producers 
are the biggest beneficiaries of prices throughout 
the chain. This appetite for high prices, lack of com-
pliance with industry standards, the reluctance to 
submit to state control and disregard for processing 
and marketing the final product, promote operating 
practices without environmental control, quality of 
mining health and safety and a fail in the reputation 
of the business.
4. Organizational structure for the sector
The regional mining environment described shows 
that due to illegality, mainly, most of the transactions 
between producers and buyers are directly performed. 
Nevertheless, it is not necessarily the best form of or-
ganization to be more economically and socially effi-
cient. In their study, Pooe & Mathu (2011) claim for 
a more collaborative supply chain to make the coal 
mining more competitive, in the South Africa’s case.
17 Tirole (2010) highlights that in spite of the existence of contracts, the final results could be different as written due to the role of Control 
Rights.
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On the other hand, for direct interchange, Spulber 
(2009, 4) highlights that the firm act as contracting 
hub and that they achieve more than would a com-
plete set of contracts between the parties. In gene-
ral, an intermediation function clears the market and 
facilitates the matching between sellers and buyers 
(Spulber, 1996b).
From this point of view I present three different al-
ternatives to organize the mining sector in Boyacá 
in order to improve efficiency and benefits for all 
the actors of the chain. First of all, the firm as the 
corporation concept from the Spulber’s perspective; 
second, an alliances structure; and finally, a coopera-
tive scheme of organization.
4.1	 A	firm	vs.	individual	interchange
Until here it is clear that small scale and artisanal 
miners have a very short vision of the mining busi-
ness and they do not have any interest in association 
activities. However, a firm is an economic vehicle 
that enhances exchange, doing it more efficient than 
the direct exchange (Spulber, 2009, 11). Its role im-
proves the information gathering and the matching 
process, decreasing transaction costs. Firms also alle-
viate financial constraints, and board monitoring by 
corporate owners (Allen & Phillips, 2000).
In this way, one of the more evident advantages of 
firm gathering producers of coal is the bargaining 
power. Given the opportunity to improve informa-
tion systems and to subscribe multiple contracts, 
allows the firm to standardize the selling process. 
By offering standard contracts, producers can go to 
the market for generalized bid-ask prices, free of tra-
ders bargain power. In Spulber (2009) this bargain 
power is considered as an externality from which, in 
this case, buyers extract benefits. Moreover, when 
this market power is big enough, these firms can 
set the bid-ask prices and the market equilibrium is 
compared with a monopoly intermediation (Spulber, 
1996a).
One argument against firm could be the fixed tran-
saction costs. According with the theory, the benefit 
derived from the firm intermediation vs. direct inter-
change must be greater than the transaction costs 
(Spulber, 2009). But under the current scheme it has 
been noticed that the gap between market price and 
buyer price offered is great enough to cover those 
fixed costs and to give benefits to the firm. According 
with the costs analysis of Benavides et al. (2011), this 
activity has a utility margin different for each type of 
coal. For thermal coal, the utility margin is around 
27% and for metallurgic coal is 76% in average. In 
Boyacá the thermal coal is around 42% of the total 
production and the metallurgic coal is 58% (Benavi-
des et al, 2011, 41).
On the other hand the analysis of fixed cost must not 
be separated from the investments analysis. As was 
highlighted in former sections, one of the problems 
of the small-scale mining is the insignificant level of 
investment and a lack of interest for technology de-
velopment. Since the firm realizes economies from 
specialization, it provides a better capacity to invest 
in equipment as in education for miners.
Added value is a consequence of this new investment 
capacity. A firm could engage projects for adding va-
lue to coal, as storage facilities, cleaning processes 
and transportation to consumer place. Current situa-
tion do not facilitates that the small producer controls 
any value added, since storage or transportation ser-
vices are in charge of traders.
Because of the characteristics of labor market in mi-
ning sector in Boyacá hiring employees by verbal 
contracts and, sometimes, under illegal schemes18, 
there is a problem that could be solved. Firm has 
the capacity of hire employees under legal schemes 
and design incentive systems that promotes an ade-
quate effort when compared to the compensation. 
Firm has to train the personnel with necessary skills 
to develop the work. This is a way to improve the 
education level of artisanal and small-scale mining, 
18 This type of contract is present in the Artisanal scale mining. The Small and Medium mining is more organized in this sense and have 
understand the importance to have formal contracts. However, contracts are subscribed just for short terms of three months to avoid 
continuity (Benavides et al. 2011, 43).
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in which currently almost 40% of miners do not have 
any education and 30% just have reached the ele-
mentary education level (Benavides et al. 2011, 53). 
On the other hand, firm provides all the required 
elements of protection to ensure that the work done 
avoid any type of risk.
Reputation and construction of a brand name en-
courage firms to improve commercial relationships. 
By the way, it allows the contracts enforcement gi-
ven that the firm operates under the institutional fra-
mework. It leads to benefits for partners, but most 
important, to consumers that will have a counterpart 
for claims and warranties.
It is evident that by this way, firm can overdue fi-
nancial constrains like capital access from traditional 
financial sector. Benavides et al. (2011) have found 
that banks use to lend money to persons by their re-
putation and a long-term relationship. The financial 
sector in Boyaca does not consider the small-scale 
producer as a subject of credit. It is due to that this 
sector perceives the producers as persons with a 
minimum technical capacity, an absence of accoun-
tancy, a lack of accomplishment of contracts, a little 
association capacity and a scarce entrepreneurial ca-
pacity (Benavides et al., 2011, 129). 
One possible barrier to this form of organization is 
related to the property rights. Not always there is a 
coincidence between the property of land, the mi-
ning official permission owner and, the person who 
is exploiting the resources. As Spulber (1989) point 
out, particularly, property rights may not be clearly 
defined for natural resources. Here achieving com-
pleteness and exclusivity is often incompatible with 
a system of private ownership (Spulber, 1989, 49). 
This situation generates social tensions and it is an 
evident obstacle for a firm scheme. It is not quite 
clear who must join the firm as partner because the 
problem needs to be solved before.
In this sense, it is absolutely necessary to have the 
State intervention through the public policy. Re-
gulations, norms, monitoring activities, promotion 
and prevention, are some of the activities the Go-
vernment is called to implement, far away from the 
merely energy consumption policy. There are many 
examples of successful public policy around the 
world; though, most of them refer to developed cou-
ntries (Gordon, 1987).
However, as Benavides et al. (2011) remark in their 
work, that idiosyncratic aspects of the producers in 
Boyacá are clear barriers to implement a corpora-
tion scheme. One of the main problems is the se-
paration of the property and control. Well-defined 
property rights are essential to the establishment of 
firms (Spulber, 2009, 66). By definition, “a firm is an 
organization whose objectives differ from those of its 
owners” (Spulber, 2009, 63). It has been identified a 
resilience and a lack of interest for associability. 
Here one can find a barrier to establish a firm whe-
re producers are the partners. A firm is a scheme in 
which the benefits are perceived as shared. Given the 
regional miner’s behavior, as individualists, it is very 
difficult for this producer to assume the partner con-
dition. An incentive problem emerges when it is not 
possible to show a clear positive benefit-cost balan-
ce to the coal producers. Incentives for artisanal and 
small scale miners are just the subsistence Benavides 
et al. (2011), while a firm has to guarantee longevity.
Clear rules between partners would be a prerequi-
site for this organizational form. Then corporate go-
vernance is an alternative to introduce these rules, 
which implies a previous education process and an 
individual approaching to generate confidence bet-
ween the partners. It has to be clear for them that 
profits are maximized when firm acts independent of 
the consumption objectives of its owners (Spulber, 
2009, 147).
Nevertheless, what is proposed here does not imply 
the necessity of integration between producing and 
trading activities. Improvements in technical, marke-
ting and financial aspects, allow the firm to subscribe 
contracts with intermediaries, as legally organized 
trader, or even with final consumers, in a more effi-
cient way. 
At the end, one of the key success factors is the wi-
llingness of the agents involved to make the firm a 
profitable business. Here one can find the major 
constraint to this proposal. First, as mentioned be-
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fore, illiteracy plus the lack of interest for association 
are determinants for a low entrepreneurial capacity. 
This argument has been developed by Molefe & 
Ashworth (2004) in the development of Small Mi-
ning Enterprises in South Africa. Second, given the 
success rate between new firms in the region, which 
is 68% within the first five years (Wengel, Ferreira, 
Restrepo & Suárez, 2008), there is an important ba-
rrier to be solved before implementing a firm scheme 
model.
Moreover, it is important to notice that one of the 
key points of the Science and Technology prospecti-
ve plan for Boyaca, is the education. Particularly, for 
mining and energy sectors, it appears as imperative 
to provide more entrepreneurial education to the po-
pulation of these sectors in order to improve compe-
titiveness and economic efficiency (Ruiz et al., 2012).
4.2 Alliances
An alliance is a flexible organization that allows firms 
to experiment with new technological, organizatio-
nal, and marketing strategies. The principle goal of 
the alliance is to learn more about technical and 
market parameters. According to Ashoka (1993) a 
few successful alliances can trigger more widespread 
alliance formation. Then, it could be a middle term 
scheme of solution for illegality problem of mining in 
Boyacá.
Alliances have different dimensions to be conside-
red. Some of them refers to the geographical origin 
of the partners, the intra or inter sector of them, for 
example (Vyas, Shelburn, & Rogers, 1995). Howe-
ver, the most important dimension to be considered 
in this case is the relationship to be established, this 
is, the motivation behind such alliance. The objec-
tive of any proposed alliance should be to improve 
the economical and social conditions of the mining 
sector in the region.
Artisanal and small-scale miners in Boyacá, given 
the characterization done before, could be conside-
red behaving as early entrepreneurs. It is, they could 
be located in the first stage of entrepreneurial pro-
cess, according to (Spulber, 2009, 153). As a matter 
of fact, in this stage the startup’s objectives are not 
separated from the owners’. Although they do not 
accomplish the firm definition, their role in regional 
economy has been recognized before. Alliances bet-
ween them could be a first step to find the financial 
resources to become firms. It could encourage the 
coal miners to legality.
In their book, Contractor & Lorange (2002) have es-
tablished that one of the key factors for the success 
of a strategic alliance is if the parties are legally able 
to join the contractual terms of the alliance. Other 
authors highlight the importance of cultural aspects 
and behavioral norms between the parts (Artz & 
Brush, 2000, 338). In fact, it is considered very diffi-
cult to establish alliances between regions (or even 
micro-regions) where cultural differences are quite 
remarkable (Fothergill, 1994). Nevertheless, eviden-
ce of cross-country alliances shows important succes-
ses (Gillingham, 1995).
Cultural barriers are clearly defined in Benavides et 
al (2011). Mining activity for small-scale and artisa-
nal miners is a short-term vision business. Illegality 
and power imbalances promote isolation between 
producers. Their propensity to opportunistic beha-
vior makes the producer as a subject not willing to 
cooperate. While the vision of the business is just the 
short term, the alliance strategy will be not viewed as 
a beneficial alternative.
According with Kandemir et. al (2006), the alliance 
orientation will depend on the capabilities of parti-
cipants for looking opportunities, coordinate the ac-
tivities and managing effectively. However, it is not 
easy to start an alliance under the features described 
above. Alliances are the arena for multiple oppor-
tunistic behavior situations (Das & Noushi, 2002). 
Moreover, Buckling & Sengupta (1993) point out 
that the success will depend mainly on the resources 
that each participant provides to the alliance. Other 
authors consider that it depends on the voluntarily 
aligment of capabilities and contractual structure 
(Haeussler & Higgins, 2013, 28).
It is recognized that institutional framework plays an 
important role in alliances strategy (Das & Noushi, 
2002; Tirole, 1994; Vyas et al., 1995). Benavides 
et al. (2011) found that institutional framework is 
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perceived in a negative way in Boyaca. The Autho-
rities in the field are perceived as prosecutors; le-
galization process as extremely complex, and other 
supporting and promoting governmental offices as 
unknown.
Provided that alliances have basically two basic fac-
tors as determinants, market and technology (Vyas 
et al., 1995, 49), it is important to have a clear vision 
of the benefits expected in the regional sector. Once 
alliances are established, they can encourage projects 
for assessing markets in a more efficient way. Value 
drivers for coal commercialization are the more im-
portant prospects. Technologies of better exploitation 
under the health and environment perspectives have 
to be in the agenda.
There are many risks that miners face in the under-
ground mining. Coal bed methane could be mentio-
ned as one of them. Mechanization and learning on 
the mining know how would offer an attractiveness 
to coal producers in the region. On the other hand, 
in spite of the lack of concern for their health, pre-
vention and security program will improve the mi-
ning conditions in the region. In general, alliances 
moderate the knowledge flow along the coal cluster 
(Contractor & Lorange, 2002, 164).
Whit this organization, partners do not need to allo-
cate common property. All the projects can be star-
ted under the shared risk model. In this way, tran-
saction costs related to the projects are treated as 
shared and assumed by a third party. The role of the 
Government as facilitator ensures a more adequate 
allocation of rights. However, Krug & Metha (2001) 
consider that an effective alliance should overcome 
this role by an adequate set of sanctions and social 
punishment .
Market exploration and finding of new customers is 
one of the biggest tasks of the alliance. When a great 
number of producers engage in a wide bargain pro-
cess there are many economic advantages and bene-
fits (Pierson, 1950). In this form, producers achieve 
a bargain power derived from greater quantities to 
negotiate, prices standardization to customers, and 
possibility to sell abroad. This strategy breaks the 
current circle depicted by intermediaries due to its 
market power in price setting (Benavides et al. 2011, 
205).
One of the problems identified when alliances opera-
te is the weak incentive to avoid cheating or oppor-
tunistic behavior (Ashoka, 1993, p. 152). Thus they 
may be thought of as experimental organizations that 
trade off the acquisition of knowledge against poten-
tial tosses due to cheating and opportunism. Compa-
red with the current framework, cheating is not a new 
practice. Due to illegality the hold-up is very common 
between producers and buyers in verbal contracts 
(gentlemen’s agreements). As was mentioned before, 
it is impossible to appeal to complete contracts. As is 
said by Artz & Brush (2000, 338), “while relational 
contracts may mitigate some opportunistic behavior, 
significant residual opportunism may remain”.
Another circumstance derived from this kind of 
association is the free riding problem. As Spulber 
(2009,  329) points out, members of the alliance 
could engage non-cooperative behavior. In this sen-
se, alliance can experience a great transaction costs 
derived from this conduct. So, again, the incentives 
design to make attractive the tradeoff between joint 
projects against transaction costs, have to play an 
important role.
Assuming that it is a real risk to face by the alliance; 
parties have to make investments that permit them 
to develop competences in distinguishing high-risk 
partners from (preferred) low risk partners and re-
duce problems of adverse selection (Contractor & 
Lorange, 2002, 154). The definition of promotion 
strategies from Government institutions must be the 
key of the alliances.
4.3 Cooperatives
It is important to notice that a cooperative is not 
a firm. A cooperative seeks an increasing of the 
social welfare, while a firm seeks to increase the 
stockholders’ welfare. In such way, the subjec-
tive interests of the members (owners) influence 
the cooperative’s production decisions, provided 
that its interests are mainly social. Then, there is 
not separation of ownership and control (Spulber, 
2009).
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Koljatic & Silva (2011) find that cooperatives are a 
kind of organization in low-income sectors in Latin 
America. These authors point out that self-organized 
groups share risks and benefits and take advantage 
of some tax exemptions. According to Bonus (1986), 
one of the main advantages of this organization is 
that the members gain the benefits of collective orga-
nization and, on the other hand, they keep their in-
dependent operation. Undoubtedly, this is the center 
of the analysis in this case, and is how to reach the 
equilibrium between independency and social bene-
fits for coal producers.
Multcher (1980) has studied coal cooperatives in 
US as a means of providing services and to impro-
ve their economic position in coal markets, and has 
demonstrated the potential benefit-cost for the par-
ticipants. On the other hand, Rieber & Soo (1975) 
analyzed the feasibility of marketing/transportation 
cooperatives composed of small coalmines produ-
cers, primarily located in Alabama, Kentucky, Ohio, 
Western Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and 
West Virginia.
There is no doubt that the cooperative form of or-
ganization has received attention and has supported 
many productive units. By this form, it is possible to 
undertake projects that can serve as support units for 
established producers. This has mainly been the spi-
rit of producer cooperatives in different areas. 
In Boyaca potato cluster has implement strategies of 
association, some like cooperatives, in order to pro-
vide benefits to the associates. For example, storage 
facilities have been one of those benefits. In the case 
of coffee grain industry in Colombia, cooperatives 
not just have supported the storage, but the marke-
ting activity has been remarkable. Then, one of the 
alternatives for the cooperative is to improve the sto-
rage and classification conditions of the coal in the 
region.
There are experiences in this kind of organization 
of producers in Boyacá. Actually, Benavides et al. 
(2011) have identified at least seven experiences of 
cooperative organizations in Boyaca19. Nonetheless 
they pointed out that the experiences from miners 
have been not always positive and they perceive the 
costs of association but not the same way the be-
nefits. In most of the cases, there are no major mo-
tivations to maintain the cooperative by members, 
beyond the right of exploitation (Benavides et al. 
2011, 74).
Cooperatives, however, have received a hard criti-
cism from different perspectives. According to Spul-
ber (2009, 331) cooperatives experience several ty-
pes of transaction costs that affect their efficiency in 
allocating resources. Given that the cooperative has 
an organization framework that is based in the de-
mocratic participation of the associates; participants 
face high cost of operating and monitoring. On the 
other hand, as was mentioned before, perceptions 
of the coal producers about their cooperative expe-
riences indicate that they find the costs of operating 
quite expensive against the benefits derived from the 
organization. As well Spulber (2009) warns that the 
transaction costs for a cooperative increases with the 
number of participants (diseconomies of scale). As 
a matter of fact, Bonus (1986) affirms that the ar-
gument of having economies of scale is not strong 
enough to justify a cooperative.
The experiences identified by Benavides et al. (2001) 
show that there has been different projects develo-
ped that has not received the expected attention by 
the members of the cooperative. For example, in the 
case of CARBOPAZ, facilities for storage and classi-
fication are not employed by most of the members 
(Benavides et al. 2011, 74). It could be due to a poor 
managerial ability of the cooperative; or even, the 
lack of interest of the users.
On the other hand, results show that under the cu-
rrent operation scheme, the interest to be associated 
to the cooperative is minimum. Producers have to 
sale the entire production to the cooperative; at the 
same time, they must pay a fee directly related to 
19 Some cooperatives are well recognized; as CARBOPAZ , which has been working for 19 years as producer cooperative. It has its own 
explotation title in Socotá and gathers more than 32 partners, and other partners working in other titles.
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20 Source: own adaptation from Benavides et al. (2011, 203-207)
Table 3. Analysis of the results under the proposed organization alternatives20
Dimension Current Situation Firm Alliance Cooperative
Business Term 
Vision
A short-term vision. In most 
of the cases it is just a 
subsistence way of life
A firm has a long-term vision 
by definition and the key is the 
separation between its objec-
tives and those of the owners 
(Spulber, 2009)
Will depend on the results and, 
mainly, on the ability to measure 
its performance; but in general, 
alliances are persistent (Inkpen & 
Ross, 2001)
As the cooperative has social 
objectives, it transcends the merely 
immediate profit goal
Associativity
Multiple attempts, most of 
them failed by the primacy 
of personal interests over 
those of the group
As stockholders of a firm, 
producers are committed with 
their own welfare. Perhaps, it 
exacerbates the detected indi-
vidualism
A key factor for associativity will be 
the attention of the local necessi-
ties. Here, the role of the Govern-
ment as facilitator is imperative
A cooperative by definition is a 
voluntary association of persons 
in order to achieve social common 
benefits (Koljatic & Silva, 2011)
Legality
Illegal producers, mainly in 
small-scale and artisanal 
mining
In order to accomplish with 
the separation criterion, the 
firm requires a legal scheme of 
operation
Negotiation under a formal scheme 
with written contracts. Nonetheless, 
alliances will recognize limitations 
and constrains of producers; then, 
alliances will provide technical and 
legal support
Members shall be encouraged to 
legality in order to get benefits 
from tax exemptions and other legal 
advantages for cooperatives
Commerciali-
zation
High uncertainty due to the 
price volatility. A minimum 
ability of producers to 
negotiate
The firm reduces the transaction 
cost of marketing. It matches the 
buyers and sellers and improves 
efficiency from trade (Spulber, 
2009)
Prices will be defined by contracts. 
As the intermediaries will be part-
ners of the alliance, they will not 
have a dominant position
Cooperative agreements give to 
the relationship stability in the long 
term and reduce the transaction 
costs 
Financing
Dependency of the inter-
mediaries. The latters fill 
the financial sector absence 
and establish the conditions 
of the payments
The assets are the main collate-
ral to have access to the formal 
financial sector and to obtain 
credit at fare interest rates
Producers could have access to the 
formal financial sector through the 
alliance. A financial operator (trust) 
should play the role of managing 
financial resources
Given the more intimate knowledge 
of the members, Cooperatives can 
act as a money lender like credit 
unions (Bonus, 1986, 318)
Information
Producers do not have 
access to the market, or 
even to the final clients
It gathers information on de-
mand and supply in order to 
match them in an efficient way
The largest and most experienced 
partners will afford artisanal and 
small-scale producers with more 
market knowledge and access to 
final customers
Acting as a hub for producers, high 
volumes and value added give the 
cooperative more bargain power and 
access to the market
Contracts
Difficulty of the producers 
to accomplish the cove-
nants
It can write contracts subject 
to the institutional an legal 
enforcement
Commercial agreements establish 
economical sanctions and legal 
punishments in case of non-com-
pliance of contracts
Members involved in this kind of 
organization are threatened by the 
opportunistic behavior, but they act 
as a coalition in which cooperation 
is the key. Then they define inner 
rules to achieve the members com-
mitment (Bonus, 1986, 327)
Producer 
autonomy
Most of the producers 
are afraid of losing their 
autonomy
According to Spulber (2009) 
well-defined property rights are 
essential for firms. These pro-
perty rights must be complete, 
exclusive and transferable
Alliances are respective of the 
producer autonomy
Members have to keep the coope-
rative agreement and are granted 
to intervene just by means of the 
established democratic instances
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their production level. However, the cooperative is 
not able to support the individual producer in finan-
cing with the financial sector (Benavides et al. 2011, 
74).
The results obtained by Benavides et al. (2011) 
from the field, are important inputs in the analysis of 
the different alternatives drawn here. Each of them 
would have diverse impacts on the social and eco-
nomical situation for mining in the region. Those 
impacts need to be considered in defining the future 
this sector in Boyacá. The following are the most im-
portant results under each alternative (Table 3).
5. Conclusions and remarks
Davidson (1993) sustains that the small-scale and 
artisanal mining cannot be ignored or eliminated; 
he argues the necessity of Governments and private 
sectors intervention in legalizing it. The purpose of to 
evaluate three different alternatives of organization 
for this sector is to maximize its social and economi-
cal benefits.
It is necessary to encourage the artisanal and small-
scale miners to find any organizational form that 
promotes the legalization and avoid asymmetries in 
their contractual relationships. At the same time, it is 
necessary to improve the social, economic, environ-
mental and personal conditions, under those miners 
work. It is clear that they need formation in techni-
ques of coal exploitation, as well in entrepreneurial 
abilities and knowledge. Some extent of collabora-
tion between them also is necessary.
It has been depicted the idiosyncratic feature that 
could restrict the cooperation due to the remarkable 
individualism of the local miners. Allocation of rights, 
moral hazard, free riding and contracts enforcement 
are the main barriers to organize the producers, par-
ticularly, small-scale and artisanal miners.
From this point of view, and given the analysis of 
proposed alternatives, alliances are a well mecha-
nism for organization of the mining sector in Boyaca. 
In the current situation, the legal processes for legali-
zation are perceived as extremely complex (Benavi-
des et al. 2011). Other organizative forms as firms or 
cooperatives that requires legal partners should fail in 
the middle term. 
Opportunistic behavior is a real menace for the mo-
del. Nonetheless, more complete contracts and en-
forcement should reduce the negative impact of this 
menace. A third party monitoring is perceived as 
guarantor of efficiency in a long-term relationship. 
However, some authors consider that it is necessary 
to tolerate some level of opportunism (Wathne & 
Heide, 2000). 
In the first steps, it is clear that the alliance strategy 
could be hard to implement, according with Inkpen 
& Ross (2001). Nonetheless, with the time social and 
political mechanisms of enforcement guarantee the 
persistence of the alliance. Moreover, the informal 
contracts are a significant support for formal con-
tracts since they are based on trustiness and loyalty 
(Frankel, Whipple & Frayer, 1996)
The main contention is that changes are bene-
fic not only for producers, but for the actors in the 
coal supply chain, as pointed out in previous studies 
(Pooe & Mathu, 2011). Small-scale miners could be-
neficiate more in cooperating with bigger firms; they 
can access more easily to financing, as proposed by 
Tirole (2010). Intermediaries involved will decrease 
their market power and this cleans the market and 
facilitates competence. Clients could obtain more 
quality and fair prices.
From the point of view of institutions, Government 
has a key role as facilitator. Allocation of rights and 
contract enforcement are main activities to develop. 
However, the extent of its participation overcomes 
the merely legal role. Promoting activities and edu-
cation are part of a long-term strategy.
The scope of this work is not to propone a complete 
and definitively organizational form, but to put on 
the table the discussion from the point of view of the 
theory of the firm. It is necessary further research in 
fields like organizational behavior to guarantee the 
persistence of any organizational model.
There is no doubt that the theory of the firm indica-
tes that actually there is an opportunity to make the 
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Boyaca’s coal industry more competitive and eco-
nomically better efficient. Communities and society 
will be the beneficiaries. However, it is necessary the 
Government intervention through the public policy 
to reach the objective.
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